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Does religion matter to informal finance? 
Evidence from trade credit in China 
 
Abstract 
Informal finance plays an important role in transitional economies with weak legal institutions, 
like China. As a major informal finance instrument, trade credit relies on informal institutions and 
enforcement. We argue that religion enhances the ethical climate in which firms do business, and 
we predict that religiosity increases trade credit, in that religion enhances enforcement by 
increasing non-pecuniary cost and reducing risk-taking. The results based on Chinese non-state 
listed firms between 2003 and 2013 confirm our prediction that firms located in high religiosity 
regions are associated with more trade credit, especially in regions where formal institutions are 
weak or formal financing channels are limited. Furthermore, we show that religiosity reduces 
overdue trade credit. Finally, the results are driven by Buddhism, Taoism, and Christianity but not 
Islam.  
 
Keywords: trade credit; religion; informal institution; informal finance 
JEL codes: G3; Z12 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Religion is believed to provide social capital such as religious beliefs that lead to more 
ethical conduct. The literature that operationalizes business ethics in different ways documents 
mixed results (Peifer, 2015). For example, Conroy et al. (2004) find that the ethical attitudes of 
surveyed students are affected by religiosity in the US, while Brammer et al. (2007) show that 
religious individuals do not prioritize the responsibilities of their firm different from non-religious 
individuals. Hooy and Ali (2016) find that Shariah firms and non-Shariah firms are the indifferent 
in performance. However, firms with a Muslim CEO have significantly lower performance. In this 
article, we further expand the analysis by focusing on the relationship between religion and the 
under-researched area of informal finance.  
Informal finance plays an important role in countries with under-developed financial 
institutions, complementing the formal financial system to fund firm operations and promote 
economic growth (Ayyagari et al., 2010). Trade credit, one informal finance instrument, is an 
unsecured short-term loan from suppliers to a firm, and it serves as a critical source for corporate 
financing in cases where it is challenging to obtain bank loans and other formal credit instruments 
(Lin and Chou, 2015). For instance, due to a generally lacking formal financial system in China, 
Ge and Qiu (2007) document that the average ratio of accounts payable to sales is 46.9% for private 
firms (non-state-owned enterprises). A critical element of informal finance is the contract 
enforcement between creditors and debtors, which relies on informal local institutions, including 
relationships and the reputations of the parties involved. Informal finance has certain comparative 
advantages over a formal financial system in terms of credit evaluation, monitoring efficiency, and 
enforcing repayment (Ayyagari et al., 2010). Given the importance of religiosity in shaping 
informal institutions and influencing the economic attitudes and activities of individuals, groups, 
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and societies (Iannaccone, 1998; Peifer, 2015), its impact on informal finance is still under-studied. 
This paper intends to fill the gap in the context of Chinese private firms whose rapid economic 
growth largely relies on both informal finance and informal institutions (Allen et al., 2005).  
Specifically, we use trade credit to gauge the level of informal finance among these private 
firms, and examine the role of religiosity as an alternative evaluation, monitoring, and enforcement 
mechanism (hereafter alternative mechanism) on the level of trade credit. When trade credit takes 
place, suppliers deliver goods or services to customers; the customers do not pay immediately, but 
promise to pay later. The suppliers assume the risk that the customers may default in the future. 
Hence, suppliers conduct credit evaluations before extending trade credit. After trade credit 
extension, suppliers then focus on monitoring and enforcement of repayment. Few studies go 
beyond the creditworthiness of a firm when examining the role of informal institutions on trade 
credit.   
Drawing from studies that examine the impact of religiosity on corporate financial 
behavior, we contend that the extent of religiosity in the area which a firm located is positively 
related to the trade credit it receives. We predict that firms located in a high religiosity region are 
given more trade credit. Our argument echoes recent studies on the impact of religiosity on various 
corporate financial policies. As Du (2013) suggests, religion affects how individuals think and 
behave. Religiosity contributes significantly to the shaping of culture and individual behavior, 
which make up the informal institution in a society. Among the many elements of informal 
institutions, two important behaviors are the underlying good intention of borrowers to repay debts, 
and lenders’ willingness to extend loans. In general, religiosity teaches positive thinking and good 
behavior. Thus, ceteris paribus, religiosity makes borrowers more willing to repay lenders and 
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lenders more willing to grant informal credit. Religiosity promotes a lender/borrower good faith 
atmosphere to facilitate informal finance.  
We study the relation between religiosity (Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, and Islam) and 
trade credit in China using all public non-state-owned listed firms during 2003-2013. The Chinese 
data are interesting for several reasons. First, as an emerging market, China has many capital 
market impediments, so a large portion of non-state-owned Chinese firms find it difficult to obtain 
formal financing. According to the World Business Environment Survey in 1999-2000, 80% of 
non-state-owned Chinese firms reported that formal corporate financing, such as bank loans, was 
a major obstacle in doing business in China. The reliance on informal finance such as trade credit, 
among Chinese non-state-owned firms is therefore unavoidable and perhaps critical. China 
provides a good natural setting to examine the role that informal institutions, such as religiosity, 
play on the extent of trade credit.  
Second, as a culturally and ethnically diverse society, China has three of the major religions 
in the world (Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam) in addition to the Chinese religion of Taoism. We 
are able to conduct a comprehensive analysis on the impact of different religions on trade credit. 
We have no a priori reason to suggest that all four different religions have the same magnitude of 
impact on trade credit. To be able to examine four different religiosities at the same time is a major 
improvement over the religiosity and corporate behavior literature, which typically examines one 
or two religions.  
We find that, consistent with our hypothesis, firms located in high religiosity regions have 
more trade credit than firms located in low religiosity regions, supporting the notion that religiosity, 
in general, helps a firm to obtain a favorable credit character evaluation in the trade credit process. 
That is, religiosity plays the role of an effective alternative mechanism in credit evaluation, 
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monitoring, and enforcement of repayment during the process of informal finance. However, 
among the four different religions, the impact is confined to Buddhism, Christianity, and Taoism. 
Thus, not all religions are the same, which echoes the findings in Jiang et al. (2015). Our findings 
are robust to alternative measures of religiosity impact and trade credit. In addition, trade credit in 
high religiosity regions has a smaller default rate in accounts payable than in low religiosity 
regions, corroborating our argument that religiosity plays the role of an alternative mechanism in 
contract enforcement, and enhances a borrower’s credit character. Furthermore, our additional 
results suggest that the positive relation between religiosity and trade credit is less pronounced 
when a firm is located in a region with a strong formal legal institution and in regions (or in times) 
in which it is less challenging to obtain bank loans. Therefore, our results suggest that religiosity, 
as an informal institution, can only partially be a substitute for formal legal institution. High 
religiosity can boost the credit character of the borrower in the trade credit evaluation process. 
Overall, our results suggest that religion plays the role of an alternative mechanism to assist parties 
making informal finance decisions. 
We make three contributions to the literature. First, we provide the first study on the role 
of religiosity in informal finance and extend the limited business ethics literature on trade credit. 
As the first business ethics empirical study on trade credit, our results enrich the understanding of 
determinants of trade credit decisions. Essentially, we complement Wu et al. (2014) and Cowton 
and San-Jose (2016) by showing that trade credit indeed depends on informal institutions as well 
as financial factors. Further research on trade credit needs to consider informal institutions. 
Second, our results extend the findings around religion and corporate financial behaviors in Du 
(2013, 2014). In addition to the moral and ethical impact of religiosity on corporate behaviors, we 
present evidence showing religiosity can serve as an alternative mechanism in facilitating the 
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informal finance process to enhance firm financing and economic activities. Third, we provide 
strong and robust evidence that there is a substitution effect between religiosity (one of informal 
institutions and important social norms) and formal legal institution. High religiosity can help a 
borrower to build up its credit character in the context of trade credit. Fourth, we do not find any 
impact of Islam on trade credit, suggesting that the role of religiosity in the informal financing 
process is not universal; instead, it is religion-specific. Overall, the finding suggests that religion 
is an important alternative mechanism to shape credit environment and facilitate firms in emerging 
markets access to informal finance. Freedom of religious worship policies could help to enhance 
business ethics in China. Firms may take clients’ religious environment into consideration when 
managing credit and account receivable. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
Informal finance, trade credit, and institutions 
Financial and legal systems play important roles in economic development (Beck and 
Levine, 2002; La Porta et al., 1998; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, 1999). For the last 30 years, 
while China has had capital impediments and a weak legal institution, it has enjoyed rapid 
economic growth. According to recent World Bank statistics, the annual GDP growth rates in China 
were 9.5%, 7.8%, 7.7%, and 7.3% in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively. Unlike other 
emerging economies, China is a counter example in the literature on law, institutions, finance, and 
growth (Allen et al., 2005). It is noted that China’s private sector is under severe financial 
constraints due to an inadequate formal financial system (Brandt and Li, 2003; Cull and Xu, 2003, 
2005). Nonetheless, the private sector has had faster growth than the public sector (Allen et al., 
2005). Allen et al. (2005) attribute the success of the Chinese private sector and its economy to the 
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informal institution and financial system. Hasan et al. (2009) further suggest that Chinese private 
firms rely heavily on informal financial channels and self-financing. 
As an informal finance instrument, trade credit can ease the adverse impact of credit crunch 
and credit market friction (Bond, 2004). Petersen and Rajan (1997) suggest that when a firm is 
under financial constraints, it relies on trade credit as an important source of financing. Fisman 
and Love (2003) examine trade credit in different countries and document that the growth of trade 
credit is much faster among developing countries with poor formal financial systems. Ge and Qiu 
(2007) contend that trade credit is critically important to private firms in countries without a sound 
formal financial system. They suggest that implicit contractual relations between a firm and its 
stakeholders are especially important in such a scenario. Firms can continue to grow through 
informal finance. Ayyagari et al. (2010) study 2,400 Chinese firms in 18 cities during 2000-2003 
and report that a large percentage of their sample firms heavily rely on informal finance rather than 
formal bank financing. Overall, this cluster of the literature suggests that trade credit is a partial 
substitute for formal credit in developing countries.  
 
Religion and corporate behavior 
Several studies suggest that religion and corporate financial behavior are related, though 
they focus primarily on obvious social and ethical issues. Iannaccone (1988) explains that early 
studies commonly consider religion as a category of behavior largely immune to the rational 
calculus in a long time. But since the 1970s, economists and sociologists have returned to Adam 
Smith’s insights (1965, pp.740) that religiosity also follows economics principles. For instance, 
Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) suggest that religious people consider afterlife consumption into their 
utility function. Every religion has some discussions about the afterlife. Thus, any bad behavior in 
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the current life is costly to afterlife. Therefore, besides legal restraints, people with religious beliefs 
also incur religious restraints in making decisions (Conroy et al., 2004). Specifically, Smith (1776, 
p. 740) states: 
Self-interest motivates clergy just as it does secular producers; that market forces constrain 
churches just as they constrain secular firms; and that the benefits of competition, the 
burdens of monopoly, and the hazards of government regulation are as real for religion as 
for any other sector of the economy.  
 
A number of studies document the influence of religious beliefs on firm policy and 
outcome. Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) reports that earnings opacity is negatively correlated with the 
degree of law enforcement and church attendance in a 24-country study. El Ghoul et al. (2012), 
using a sample of US firms, find that firms located in high religiosity counties incur below-average 
equity financing costs. These studies imply that religion matters in corporate behavior. McGuire 
et al. (2012) show that firms in high religiosity areas incur fewer financial reinstatements and less 
misrepresentation of financial statements. Djan and Mersland (2017) find that, compared with 
secular MFIs, Christian microfinance institutions have stricter governance mechanisms, as 
reflected by more board meetings, more international directors, and more recognized external 
auditors. 
With respect to Eastern religiosity, Du (2013) reports that Chinese firms located in high 
religiosity regions of Buddhism and Taoism regions displays less severe owner-manager agency 
costs than firms in other regions. Du (2014) finds that firms in high Buddhism regions incur less 
tunneling. Overall, the literature reports that religiosity is influential and can make firms behave 
morally and ethically. Taking all the related literature together, we conclude that informal finance, 
such as trade credits, plays a vital role in helping corporate financing. 
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Testable hypotheses 
Trade credit suppliers need to evaluate credit risk, monitoring, and enforcement of 
repayment before extending trade credit to a debtor. Besides a formal credit evaluation, we contend 
that trade credit suppliers have to factor in the informal institution environment in making a trade 
credit decision.  
In the context of religiosity and trade credit, we argue that there are three relevant 
perspectives. First, we contend that the propensity of not honoring a contract by a debtor is less 
likely in a high religiosity region. Religious doctrines generally teach followers to behave morally 
and ethically. Hence, ceteris paribus, a firm is more likely to repay trade credit to avoid feelings 
caused by not paying. Under the influence of religiosity, the followers will do “the right thing” 
when their firms have outstanding trade credit. The non-pecuniary cost (e.g., feeling guilty and 
immoral) of not repaying trade credit is high. Religiosity is a hidden guarantee to a creditor. Thus, 
trade credit default is lower and suppliers are more willing to extend trade credit in a high 
religiosity region. Second, firms located in high religiosity regions have generally fewer risky 
practices due to the risk-averse nature of religious followers. Therefore, ceteris paribus, suppliers 
are willing to extend trade credit to these low-risk firms. Third, firms located in high religiosity 
areas are able to attract business partners that share similar religiosity backgrounds and ideology. 
The bonding among these firms is better due to religiosity. The business-religiosity network further 
reinforces their informal relationship, which enhances trading credit financing (El Ghoul et al., 
2012). Hence, suppliers with high religiosity are willing to extend more trade credit to customers. 
We hereby propose H1 as follows: 
H1: Religiosity has a positive impact on trade credit 
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Regarding the impact of informal institutions on behavior, the literature generally suggests 
that such impact is higher in an environment with weak formal institution (Allen et al., 2005). 
Specifically, Grullon et al. (2010) report that religiosity plays a more important role in firms with 
weak corporate governance than those with strong corporate governance, suggesting that 
religiosity and formal institution are partial substitutes.  
Trade credit is an informal contract. Formal and informal institutions both play a role in 
the trade credit process. Guiso et al. (2004) report that trade credit is determined by both the formal 
and informal institutions (e.g. law and culture) between suppliers and firms. McGuire et al. (2011) 
find that, in a weak legal investor protection environment, religiosity is able to reduce aggressive 
financial reporting. El Ghoul et al. (2012) document that before Sarbanes-Oxley Act, financing 
costs were lower among US firms in high religiosity regions than in low religiosity regions. These 
studies suggest that religiosity can be a partial substitute for formal institution and, most 
importantly, can mitigate the adverse impact of capital market impediments (e.g., due to poor 
investor protection and formal monitoring) so that it facilitates trade credit. Essentially, a religion’s 
doctrines of behaving ethically, morally, and conservatively offer an implicit guarantee. These 
doctrines foster a good faith environment so that lenders are willing to grant, and borrowers have 
tendencies to repay, their trade credit. Hence, when a firm is located in a weak formal institution 
region, the impact of religiosity is stronger than if it is located in a strong formal institution region. 
Our second testable hypothesis is:  
H2: The impact of religiosity on trade credit is less pronounced in regions with strong formal 
institutions. 
 
Among the literature related to the Chinese environment, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2001) and Lin and Chou (2015) document specifically that bank loans and informal finance are 
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substitutes for each other. A majority of small private Chinese firms use informal finance to operate 
(Allen et al., 2005). If a firm can obtain financing from banks, it naturally has less demand for 
trade credit (Wu et al., 2014). As a result, firms rely less on religiosity as an implicit guarantee to 
access trade credit. If our core hypothesis of religiosity and trade credit is valid, we would expect 
that, ceteris paribus, the relation should be less pronounced among firms in regions where large 
bank loans are available. A firm located in such regions would not rely much on trade credit. Our 
third testable hypothesis is:  
H3: The impact of religiosity is less pronounced for firms located in regions where large bank 
loans are available. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data and key variable definitions 
Our sample consists of all publicly listed non-state-owned firms in China from 2003 to 
2013. Non-state-owned firms are listed firms where the government (central and local) and its 
associated ministries and business units are not the dominant or controlling shareholder. Instead, a 
private individual/family or foreign firm is the largest shareholder. After excluding financial firms 
and any firm-year observations with missing data, our final sample is reduced to 7,119 firm-year 
observations of 1,401 unique firms. The financial data are obtained from the China Stock Market 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. We winsorize the financial variables at the 1% 
level. 
Following Hilary and Hui (2009), we measure a firm’s religiosity (RELIGION) as the 
number of religious shrines within a 200-kilometer radius around a listed firm’s registered address. 
We identify national religious shrines following two lists: (1) The list issued by the State Council 
in 1983; and (2) the list issued by the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau in 2010. We merge the 
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two lists and eliminate duplicates. We find records of 303 Buddhist monasteries, 80 Taoist temples, 
180 churches, and 223 mosques. A map of the locations of national key religion shrines in China 
is shown in Figure 1.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Methods 
To test the hypotheses, we use the panel data to estimate the pooled ordinary least squares 
(POLS) regression:   
  𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
Where AP is a firm’s trade credit divided by total assets. Trade credit includes total account 
payables, account payables due within one year, and account payables due over one year. 
RELIGION is a firm’s religious characteristic, and CONTROL is a vector of the firm-level 
characteristics as defined in Appendix 1. We the cluster standard errors by year and firm, and apply 
year and industry fixed effects. We also perform a number of robustness checks in addition to the 
baseline results.  
Summary statistics 
The descriptive statistics and some univariate analyses are presented in Table 1. The mean 
accounts payable to total assets ratio (AP) is 8.3%, and 7.6% of which is due within one year and 
0.6% are overdue (long than one year). AP≤1 year (AP>1 year) denotes the ratio of accounts 
payable of within (more than) one year to total assets. AP_DUE denotes the ratio of accounts 
payable of more than one year to total accounts payable (Wu et al., 2014). In Appendix 2, we shows 
that firms with above mean/median RELIGON measures consistently have higher trade credit 
amounts than firms with below mean/median RELIGON measures.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Baseline results 
We present the baseline results of trade credit and religion in Table 2. Across Models (1) to 
(3), the coefficients of the RELIGON variables are significantly positive at the 1% or 5% level, 
supporting H1 on the positive impact of religiosity on trade credit.  
We incorporate social trust that may influence trade credit (Wu et al., 2014) as well as a 
number of additional control variables that capture provincial economic development. The 
expanded results are presented in the 3.1. Among all five models, the coefficients of the RELIGON 
variable are significantly positive, confirming the positive impact of RELIGON on trade credit 
after taking social trust into account. For the TRUST variable, it is not significant in Model (1) but 
becomes positive and significant in Model (5), suggesting that religion is a more stable factor than 
social trust in the determination of trade credit. Among the different economic development 
variables, only TRA is positive and significant. In Model (6) we apply province fixed effects to 
control for unobservable regional traits that may determine the level of trade credit financing. The 
results remain consistent. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Different Religions 
We leverage the unique Chinese environment to examine the impact of different religions 
on trade credit. It is natural that different religions have different characteristics. Weber (1905) 
summarizes two major differences. First, Christianity and Islam have had religious reforms over 
the years, while Buddhism and Taoism have not experienced any religious reform. Second, 
Christianity and Islam are exclusivist religions, while Buddhism and Taoism practice inclusivity.  
To account for different religions, we decompose the RELIGION variable into four 
different variables depending on the number of specific religious sites. The results are presented 
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in Panel A of Table 3. The coefficients of the RELIGION variable in Models (1) to (4) use 
Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, and Islam, respectively1. Among the four models, we only find 
positive and significant coefficients for Buddhism, Taoism, and Christianity in Models (1) to (3). 
In Model (4), the coefficient of Islam is not significant. The results suggest that not all religions 
are the same in the context of trade credit financing.   
There are a number of possible reasons for the insignificant impact of Islam. First, Islamic 
financing and banking services might be available for firms located close to Islamic shrines, 
making these firms rely less on trade credit as an important alternative financing channel to 
alleviate financial constraints. Because of the Qur’an’s prohibition of interest (riba), the Islamic 
financial model works on the basis of risk sharing. Typical instruments include partnership 
(Musharaka), profit-sharing (Mudaraba), cost-plus financing (Murabaha), leasing (Ijara), and 
forward sale (Bay’salam). The Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report, published by 
the Islamic Financial Services Board, shows that global Islamic banking reached an overall value 
of USD 1,496 billion by the end of 2015. There is evidence that Islamic finance remains under-
developed in China. Business Week (Chinese version, 2013) reported that Ningxia Bank launched 
a pilot program of Islamic bank business in 2009, but total Sharia-compliant savings only 
amounted to 50 million RMB in 2011. Islamic banking service is therefore unlikely to be a viable 
financing channel for Chinese listed firms.  
The second reason is that our measure of religiosity is less applicable to Islam. Unlike Taoist 
and Buddhist temples and churches, many mosques in China are not open to non-Muslim visitors. 
Public engagement and widening participation in religious events can create more interaction 
opportunities for local communities. The restriction on non-Muslim visitors means that geographic 
                                                          
1 The database does not allow us to further classify Christianity into Protestant or Catholic. 
16 
 
proximity to mosques is a less viable indicator of religiosity. Since data on the entry restrictions of 
different mosques are not available, we are not able to directly test possible reasons.  
Finally, the religious exclusivism of Islam on the one hand increases the spiritual bonding and 
business ethics among adherents, but may also hinder the business between adherents and non-
adherents. This implies that a rich diversity of different types of religions may limit the benefits of 
religiosity. To perform the analysis, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to measure 
religiosity diversity. It is calculated by squaring the share of each type of religious shrine in the 
region, and then summing the resulting numbers as follows: 
RELIGIONDIV  = 1 − ∑ (𝑅𝑖/𝑅)
2𝑁
𝑖=1      (2) 
where N is the categories of religion around a firm and R is the sum of religious sites around 
a firm of all religions. Ri is the sum of religious sites of i
th religion. In Table 3, we regress the 
diversity measure on trade credits. The positive impact on trade credit is not observed from the 
diversity between Western religions (Christianity and Islam) or from the diversity between Islam 
and other religions. The results support our conjecture. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the 
results are different for the diversity of the four religions (Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, and 
Islam) and the diversity of Eastern religions (Buddhism and Taoism). Their coefficients are 
significantly positive at the 1% level, suggesting the influence of multiple moral authorities to 
beget a more ethical climate in business.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Moderating effect of formal institution and bank financing 
To account for the moderating effect of formal institution, we use four different indices to 
capture the level of formal institution in China. They are: (1) property right protection index; (2) 
number of lawyers over total population in the province; (3) preferential policy of a province; and 
(4) whether the firm is located in a treaty port. These dummy variables carry a value of one if the 
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property right protection index and the number of lawyers per total population are above their 
respective medians; they also take a value of one if the preferential policy of the province is below 
its median and the firm is in a treaty port (detailed definitions are in Appendix 1). The regression 
results are presented in Table 4. The coefficients for the interaction variable RELIGION*FINSITU 
are negative and significant at the 1% or 5% level across Models (1) to (4), indicating that the level 
of formal institution attenuates the positive association between religion and a firm’s trade credit. 
The findings support H2. 
To account for the challenge of bank financing, we use bank loan, financial development, 
financial competition, and monetary policy to represent the challenge of obtaining formal bank 
financing. These dummy variables carry a value of one if it is less difficult to for a firm to obtain 
bank financing. The findings are presented in Table 5. Across all four models, the coefficients 
associated with the interaction variable RELIGION*BFINANCING are negative and significant, 
suggesting that when a firm is located in a region with good access to bank financing or during 
times of easy bank financing, the relation between religion and trade credit weakens. The results 
support H3. 
[Insert Table 4 and 5 about here] 
 
Robustness check 
Since the national key religious shrines are historical legacy, the location of the religious 
shrines are not possibly to be determined by modern finance. Reverse causality is not a concern 
for the setting. We also applied the province fixed effects to control for unobservable regional traits 
that may determine the level of trade credit financing.  
To mitigate the concern of measurement error in religiosity, we use alternative 
specifications for robustness checks. For RELIGON, we alter the radius to 100, 220, 250, and 300 
kilometers and then replace it by the estimated driving distance and driving time from 
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lbsyun.baidu.com. The results are presented in Appendix 3.2-3.3 are consistent. We also use the 
number of registered religious groups (GroupNum) in the firm’s headquartered county as an 
additional measure for the religiosity. Firm fixed effects is applied to control for time-invariant 
unobservable firm characteristics. The results remain consistent. We also examine alternative 
accounts payable, measured by the natural logarithm of accounts payable (LNAP) and by the ratio 
of accounts payable to total liability (AP/TL). The results remain consistent and further support 
our main findings. 
In addition, we replicate our results based on a sub-sample of firms that experienced 
relocation, which may be associated with a change in religiosity. The relocated firms have same or 
similar firm characteristics before and after the relocation, except the exposure to the religious 
environment, providing an ideal setting to control for the firm-level missing variable and 
unobserved heterogeneity. The results are consistent. Finally, we also show that city-level results 
complement the firm-level findings in Appendix 3.4. There is a large variation in the number of 
religious shrines in different provinces, and firms located in cities with more religious shrines tend 
to enjoy a higher average level of trade credit. This result articulates the explicit role of regional 
element. 
 
Religion and trade credit overdue 
Cowton and San-Jose (2016) argue that the tolerance of late payment of trade credit 
depends on culture. Table 3 only shows the relation between religiosity and aggregated trade credit. 
In accounting sense, the due of accounts payable can be less than one year or over one year. Hence, 
we examine how religiosity relates to different trade credit maturities. Both AP>1 year and 
AP_DUE capture a situation in which a firm does not pay its accounts payable on time. The results 
are presented in the 3.8. The coefficient of the RELIGION variable in the AP≤1 year model 
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continues to be positive and significant at 1%. In contrast, the coefficients of the RELIGION 
variable in both AP>1-year and AP_DUE models are negative and significant. Therefore, 
religiosity is positively correlated with short-term trade credit and is also negatively correlated 
with overdue trade credit.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Despite the commercial importance of trade credit, it has not been empirically studied in 
the business ethics literature or featured as an element of the business ethics research agenda 
(Cowton and San-Jose, 2016). We extend the limited research by exploring how religion, an 
important element of informal institutions, shapes the size and prompt payment of trade credit of 
Chinese listed non-state firms. China provides a unique setting in that private firms mainly rely on 
informal finance channels and institutions (Allen et al., 2005) and that China exhibits a diversity 
of major religions. We use the number of religious sites within 200, 220, 250, and 300 kilometers 
of listed firms to proxy religiosity and find it positively related to the amount and prompt payment 
of trade credit. We interpret the results as evidence that the geographic proximity of religious 
atmosphere enhances the enforcement of contracts through increasing non-pecuniary costs. The 
results also imply that firms located in high religiosity regions are able to establish business 
networks with other partners which share similar religiosity ideologies. We also find that the 
positive impact of religiosity on trade credit is concentrated in regions with weak formal 
institutions or limited bank loan availability. The results suggest that religion complements legal 
institutions to enhance enforcement, and in turn protects creditor rights. Finally, we provide 
evidence that differences among religions lead to different levels of investor protection. This 
confirms Stulz and Williamson’s (2003) findings that culture proxies are helpful in understanding 
the difference in the enforcement of investor rights.  
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Figure 1. A map of the locations of national key religious shrines in China 
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 Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the main analyses. AP denotes Accounts 
payable. AP_due denotes the percentage ratio of accounts payables of more than 1 year to total accounts 
payables. RELIGION denotes the number of national key religion place within a radius of 200 km around a 
listed firm’s registered address. Other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
 
Variable Mean p25 p50 p75 std. dev. 
AP  0.083 0.036 0.066 0.112 0.066 
AP(≤1 year)  0.076 0.031 0.060 0.104 0.063 
AP(>1 year)  0.006 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.016 
AP_DUE  0.087 0.000 0.000 0.081 0.190 
RELIGION  0.317 0.140 0.250 0.550 0.232 
BLOAN  0.180 0.031 0.155 0.281 0.165 
GROWTH  0.244 -0.025 0.140 0.328 0.672 
CASH  0.206 0.090 0.163 0.281 0.160 
LISTAGE  1.821 1.099 1.946 2.485 0.769 
TQ  2.604 1.399 1.977 3.005 1.964 
INVENTORY  0.170 0.072 0.130 0.215 0.154 
SIZE  21.176 20.529 21.091 21.782 1.039 
ROA  0.040 0.014 0.041 0.074 0.079 
TOP1  32.260 22.050 29.430 41.100 13.972 
OUTRAT  0.202 0.176 0.200 0.231 0.044 
MSDUM  0.464 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 
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Table 2. Religion and trade credit 
 
This table presents estimation results for the effect of religion on accounts payable. The variables are 
defined in Appendix 1. All variables but the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
The numbers reported in parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-corrected errors 
clustered by firm and year. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
(two-sided). 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES AP AP AP 
    
RELIGION 0.015** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (2.14) (2.60) (2.61) 
BLOAN  -0.020 -0.020 
  (-1.18) (-1.17) 
SGROWTH  0.006*** 0.006*** 
  (3.88) (3.96) 
CASH  -0.083*** -0.083*** 
  (-7.29) (-7.39) 
LISTAGE  -0.002 -0.002 
  (-1.17) (-0.82) 
TQ  0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (2.83) (2.84) 
INVENTORY  0.025** 0.025** 
  (2.19) (2.20) 
SIZE  0.006*** 0.006*** 
  (2.90) (2.75) 
ROA  -0.072*** -0.072*** 
  (-3.99) (-4.06) 
TOP1   0.000 
   (0.25) 
OUTRAT   -0.040* 
   (-1.69) 
MSDUM   0.002 
   (0.73) 
Constant 0.045*** -0.081* -0.070 
 (5.74) (-1.87) (-1.59) 
Industry Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y 
Observations 7,119 7,119 7,119 
R-squared 0.151 0.204 0.205 
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Table 3. The impact of different religions and religiosity diversity  
 
This table presents the impact of different religions and religiosity diversity. Panel A shows results for the 
effect of different religions on accounts payable, and Panel B shows the impact of religiosity diversity. Other 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The 
same set of control variables are incorporated as in Table 2. 
 
Panel A: The impact of different religion on accounts payable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AP AP AP AP 
     
RELIGION_BUDDHISM 0.023**    
 (2.04)    
RELIGION_TAOISM  0.305***   
  (4.58)   
RELIGION_CHRISTIANITY   0.071***  
   (3.05)  
RELIGION_ISLAM    0.009 
    (0.17) 
Control Y Y Y Y 
Industry Y Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,119 7,119 7,119 7,119 
R-squared 0.204 0.211 0.207 0.202 
 
 
Panel B: The impact of religiosity diversity on accounts payable 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Diversity 
among 
 all religions 
Diversity 
between 
Eastern and 
Western 
religions 
Diversity  
between 
Eastern 
religions 
(Buddhism 
and Taoism) 
Diversity 
between 
Western 
religions 
(Christianity 
and Islam) 
Diversity 
between Islam 
and other 
religions 
       
RELIGIONDIV 0.031*** 0.029** 0.034*** -0.003 -0.005 
 (2.87) (2.41) (3.49) (-0.31) (-0.42) 
Control Y Y Y Y Y 
      
Observations 7,119 7,119 7,119 7,119 7,119 
R-squared 0.206 0.204 0.207 0.202 0.202 
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Table 4. Formal institutions and the relations between religion and trade credit 
 
This table presents results for the effect of law on the relation between religion and accounts payable. The 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The 
same set of control variables are incorporated as in Table 2. 
 
 
Property right 
protection 
Lawyer/total 
population 
Preferential 
policy 
Treaty 
port 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AP AP AP AP 
     
RELIGION 0.048*** 0.040*** 0.055** 0.066** 
 (2.91) (2.83) (2.44) (2.54) 
RELIGION*FINSTIT
U -0.043** -0.034* -0.027* -0.054** 
 (-2.23) (-1.75) (-1.68) (-2.00) 
FINSTITU 0.014** 0.011 0.008 0.017** 
 (1.97) (1.39) (1.63) (2.57) 
Control Y Y Y Y 
Industry Y Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,119 7,119 7,119 7,119 
R-squared 0.208 0.207 0.206 0.208 
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Table 5. Bank financing and the relations between religion and trade credit 
 
This table presents results for the effect of bank financing on the relation between religion and accounts 
payable. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. The same set of control variables are incorporated as in Table 2. 
 
 Bank loan 
Financial 
development 
Financial  
competition Monetary policy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AP AP AP AP 
          
RELIGION 0.036*** 0.076** 0.074*** 0.019*** 
 (3.10) (2.40) (2.88) (2.73) 
RELIGION*BFINANCING -0.100** -0.006** -0.006** -0.029*** 
 (-2.14) (-2.18) (-2.35) (-3.65) 
BFINANCING 0.008 0.003*** 0.002* -0.008 
 (0.31) (2.60) (1.87) (-1.34) 
Control Y Y Y Y 
Industry Y Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,119 7,119 7,119 7,115 
R-squared 0.208 0.209 0.208 0.211 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Variable for main tests 
AP Accounts payable, The percentage ratio of accounts payables to total 
assets (Choi and Kim, 2005; Vicente and Cunat, 2007). 
 
AP(≤1 year) The percentage ratio of accounts payables of within 1 year to total assets 
(Wu et al., 2014) 
 
AP(>1 year) The percentage ratio of accounts payables of more than 1 year to total 
assets. (Wu et al., 2014) 
 
AP_DUE The percentage ratio of accounts payables of more than 1 year to total 
accounts payables. (Wu et al., 2014) 
 
RELIGION The number of national key religion place within a radius of 200 km 
around a listed firm’s registered address. 
 
BLOAN The ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term loans to total assets 
 
GROWTH The sales growth rate, which is calculated as the ratio of difference 
between sales in the current year and sales in the prior year to the sales in 
the current year 
 
CASH The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets 
 
LISTAGE The number of years since a firm’s IPO 
 
TQ Market value of the firm divided by total assets at the end of the year 
(Clarkson et al., 2008) 
 
INVENTORY inventory divided by total assets 
 
SIZE Firm size, calculated as the natural log of total assets 
 
ROA Return on total assets, Net profit to total assets 
 
TOP1 The percentage of common shares owned by controlling shareholder 
 
OUTRAT The ratio of the number of independent directors to the number of 
directors in the board of directors 
 
MSDUM Dummy variable for management shareholding; value of 1 if management 
owned shares, zero otherwise (Meng et al. 2012; Pujari et al. 2004; 
Sharma 2000) 
Variables for further tests and robustness checks 
 
TRUST A provincial level index, from a survey conducted by the ‘‘Chinese 
Enterprise Survey System’’ in 2001 that measures the trustworthiness of 
enterprises in China, where a higher index value suggests a more 
trustworthy enterprise business community in the province. We use the 
natural logarithm of the value as a proxy for social trust. 
 
GDPG GDP per capita growth rate of the province 
 
EDU percent of population finished high school or above education 
 
TRA Natural logarithm of the sum of the railway mileage and highway mileage 
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RELIGION_100KM 
 
The number of national key religion place within a radius of 100 km 
around a listed firm’s registered address 
 
RELIGION_220KM The number of national key religion place within a radius of 220 km 
around a listed firm’s registered address 
 
RELIGION_250KM The number of national key religion place within a radius of 250 km 
around a listed firm’s registered address 
 
RELIGION_300KM the number of national key religion place within a radius of 300 km 
around a listed firm’s registered address 
 
RELIGION_BUDDHISM The number of national key Buddhist monasteries within a radius of 200 
km around a listed firm’s registered address 
 
RELIGION_TAOISM The number of national key Taoist temples within a radius of 200 km 
around a listed firm’s registered address 
 
RELIGION_CHRISTIANITY The number of national key Christ Church Cathedra within a radius of 200 
km around a listed firm’s registered address 
 
RELIGION_ISLAM The number of national key masjid within a radius of 200 km around a 
listed firm’s registered address 
 
LNAP Natural logarithm of accounts payable. 
 
AP/TL Accounts payable over total liabilities (Vicente and Cunat, 2007) 
 
PROPERTY RIGHT  
PROTECTION 
This index is calculated based on the total economic value of legal cases 
settled, standardized by GDP of the region. This measure is based on the 
design in Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) to capture the court 
system’s ability to enforce contracts following Fan et al., 2011) 
 
LAWYER/TOTAL 
POPULATION 
Legal environment index from which measures the development of the 
intermediary agencies and legal enforcement following Fan et al. (2011) 
 
PREFERENTIAL POLICY The amount of preferential treatments granted to a region by the central 
government to set up special economic zones during the period1978 to 
1998. (see Demruger et al., 2002) 
 
TREATY PORT After the first Opium War in 1842, China was forced to sign several 
treaties with foreigners to open treaty ports or set up leased territories. 
The period between 1842-1943 (or alternatively, 1842-1949) is referred 
to by Fairbank and Goldman (1992) as the Treaty Century, which was 
characterized by China’s increasing openness to foreign contact. These 
treaty ports are located in (1) Fujian, Guangdong, Shanghai, and Zhejiang 
(Treaty of Nanjing 1842), (2) Fujian, Hainan, Hubei, Guangdong, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, and Shandong (Treaty of Tianjin 1858), (3) Tianjin and 
Xinjiang(Treaty of Beijing 1860), (4) Anhui, Hubei, Guangxi, and Zhejiang 
(Treaty of Yantai 1876), and (5) Chongqing, Hubei, and Zhejiang (Treaty of 
Maguan, 1895). The locations of the leased territories include Tianjin 
(1860), Shanghai (1845), Jiangsu (1863), Zhjiang (1896), Anhui (1877), 
Jiangxi (1861), Fujian (1861), Shandong (1889), Guangdong (1857), 
Chongqing (1901), and Hubei (1861). (see Fan et al., 2014)) 
 
FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
It is an index by combining the financial competition and credit 
distribution in a province. The data are from Fan et al. (2011) 
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BANK LOAN The ratio of firm’s long term and short term loan to total assets 
 
FINANCIAL COMPETITION It is an index showing the proportion of deposits in non-state-owned 
banks to total deposits in the banking sector. The data are from Fan et al. 
(2011).  
 
MONETARY POLICY Monetary regime dummy variable. It takes a value of 1 if MP is below its 
median. MP = the growth of money supply (M2) minus the GDP growth 
rate and consumer price index (CPI) growth rate. When MP is 1, it means 
that it is an expansionary monetary regime or it is a less challenging 
environment to borrow.  
 
Driving Distance The nearest driving distance from firm‘s registered address to the national 
key religion place by car; where <=100Km/200Km/300Km is within 
100Km/200Km/300Km of driving distance, respectively.; 
The number of national key religion place within a radius of 220 km 
around a listed firm’s registered address 
 
Driving Time The driving time of the nearest driving distance from firm’s registered 
address to the national key religion place by car; where 
<=1.5h/<=2h/<=3h is within 1.5/2/3 hours of driving time, respectively. 
Region Fixed Effect We divided China to east-area, middle-area and west-area according to the 
seventh five-year national economic and social development plan of 
People’s Republic of China; it’s not only can reflect the condition of 
economic and social development, but also can reflect the support and 
policy given by the central government. 
  
Industry Fixed Effect Two digit CRSR industry code for manufacturing, and one digit for others. 
 
RELIGION: To construct RELIGION, we  follow (Chen et al., 2013; Du 2013a, b) to count the number 
of religious sites within a certain radius according to following steps: (1) Using Google-earth map, 
we locate the registered address of every firm and obtain its longitude and latitude, respectively; 
(2) We check the geographic location of every religious site and recognize its longitude and 
latitude; (3) We calculate the distance between a firm and a religious site as the length of the 
minor arc across the earth’s surface according to their longitudes and latitudes (Du 2013 a, b and 
Rising, 2000); (4) We use 200 kilometers as the distance criteria (the upper limits) to identify the 
number of religious sites and define RELIGION, respectively.  
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Appendix B.  
Table B1. Religious shrines and trade credit by provinces 
 All  Taoism  Buddhism  Christianity  Islam  AP 
Province Num. Rank.  Num. Rank.  Num. Rank.  Num. Rank.  Num. Rank.  Mean Obs. Rank 
Xinjiang 122 1  0 26  3 24  2 23  117 1  7.60% 94 17 
Zhejiang 65 2  7 2  36 1  20 1  2 11  9.35% 969 6 
Henan 44 3  6 4  9 14  16 2  13 4  9.86% 150 2 
Anhui 42 4  2 19  21 3  13 5  6 7  8.58% 166 9 
Fujian 41 5  8 1  19 4  13 4  1 28  8.03% 317 15 
Jiangsu 37 6  4 7  21 2  9 7  3 10  9.48% 769 4 
Jiangxi 35 7  5 6  14 10  14 3  2 15  8.12% 57 14 
Gansu 35 8  2 17  13 11  3 21  17 3  6.74% 69 25 
Yunnan 31 9  2 14  17 5  8 8  4 8  7.22% 56 20 
Hunan 30 10  4 8  16 8  8 9  2 17  8.20% 177 13 
Shaanxi 29 11  6 3  16 7  5 12  2 12  8.00% 77 16 
Sichuan 26 12  5 5  16 6  4 15  1 22  8.31% 352 10 
Ningxia 25 13  3 11  2 29  3 18  17 2  9.45% 33 5 
Shandong 24 14  2 15  3 26  11 6  8 5  8.29% 449 11 
Shanxi 22 15  1 22  14 9  5 13  2 13  10.84% 46 1 
Hebei 22 16  3 13  6 19  7 11  6 6  6.84% 117 24 
Guangdong 21 17  4 10  11 12  5 14  1 27  9.03% 1111 7 
Hubei 20 18  4 9  7 17  7 10  2 18  7.12% 301 21 
Jilin 15 19  2 16  7 16  4 17  2 16  5.62% 137 28 
Qinghai 13 20  1 23  7 15  1 29  4 9  9.80% 35 3 
Liaohai 13 21  3 12  4 21  4 16  2 14  8.95% 234 8 
Beijing 11 22  2 18  6 20  2 28  1 29  7.11% 321 22 
Tibet 10 23  0 27  10 13  0 30  0 30  8.24% 63 12 
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Shanghai 10 24  1 21  6 18  2 25  1 23  7.28% 416 19 
Guizhou 9 25  0 30  4 22  3 20  2 19  7.51% 43 18 
Chongqing 7 26  1 20  3 23  2 22  1 20  4.73% 79 31 
Heilongjiang 7 27  1 24  2 30  3 19  1 25  4.94% 104 30 
Tianjin 6 28  0 28  3 25  2 24  1 21  6.87% 41 23 
Neimeng 6 29  0 29  3 27  2 26  1 24  5.73% 82 27 
Guangxi 6 30  0 31  3 28  2 27  1 26  6.59% 104 26 
Hainan 2 31  1 25  1 31  0 31  0 31  5.32% 150 29 
Total 786   80   303   180   223   8.26% 7119  
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Table B2. Religiosity by industries 
Classify of industry 
Industry 
Mean of  
RELIGION N 
   
Agriculture, forestry, livestock farming, & fishery (A) 0.167 168 
Mining (B) 0.185 45 
Food & beverage (C0) 0.211 272 
Textile, clothes, & fur (C1) 0.421 431 
Timber & furniture (C2) 0.297 54 
Paper making & printing (C3) 0.288 184 
Petroleum, chemistry, rubber, & plastic (C4) 0.358 781 
Electronic (C5) 0.344 398 
Metal & non-metal (C6) 0.317 505 
Machinery, equipment, & instrument (C7) 0.345 1421 
Medicine & biological products (C8) 0.250 553 
Other manufacturing (C9) 0.423 153 
Electric power, gas & water production (D) 0.162 55 
Construction (E) 0.361 122 
Transport & storage (F) 0.253 74 
Information technology (G) 0.344 744 
Wholesale & retail trade (H) 0.299 344 
Real estate (J) 0.272 186 
Social service (K) 0.267 158 
Communication & cultural industry (L) 0.362 64 
Conglomerates (M) 0.231 407 
Total 0.317 7119 
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Appendix C: Additional empirical results with tabulated control variables.  
 
Table C1. Regressions for add more control variables 
This table presents estimation results of Regressions for add more control variables. The variables are 
defined in Appendix 1. All variables but the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The 
numbers reported in parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-corrected errors clustered by 
firm and year. ***, **, and * indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (two-
sided). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES AP AP AP AP AP AP 
       
RELIGION 0.014* 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 (1.95) (2.69) (2.64) (3.55) (2.77) (2.67) 
TRUST1 0.004    0.010*** 0.006 
 (1.38)    (2.81) (1.53) 
GDPG  0.000   0.001 0.001 
  (0.49)   (1.05) (1.45) 
EDU   -0.000  0.000 0.000 
   (-0.04)  (0.29) (0.43) 
TRA    0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
    (2.87) (3.77) (3.73) 
BLOAN -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.022 -0.023 -0.023 
 (-1.17) (-1.17) (-1.17) (-1.28) (-1.34) (-1.33) 
SGROWTH 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (3.98) (3.94) (3.95) (4.09) (4.18) (4.16) 
CASH -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.081*** -0.084*** -0.083*** 
 (-7.69) (-7.41) (-7.40) (-7.34) (-7.87) (-7.60) 
LISTAGE -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.72) (-0.85) (-0.82) (-0.60) (-0.36) (-0.14) 
TQ 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (2.83) (2.84) (2.85) (2.93) (2.93) (2.98) 
INVENTORY 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.026** 0.025** 
 (2.24) (2.20) (2.20) (2.20) (2.31) (2.24) 
SIZE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.005** 
 (2.65) (2.75) (2.75) (2.67) (2.39) (2.38) 
ROA -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** 
 (-4.05) (-4.06) (-4.05) (-3.98) (-3.99) (-4.01) 
TOP1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08) 
OUTRAT -0.042* -0.040* -0.040* -0.041* -0.047** -0.049** 
 (-1.77) (-1.70) (-1.69) (-1.75) (-1.99) (-2.09) 
MSDUM 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.74) (0.74) (0.73) (0.64) (0.62) (0.57) 
Constant -0.067 -0.106 -0.070 -0.131*** -0.221*** -0.234*** 
 (-1.52) (-1.24) (-1.59) (-2.66) (-2.73) (-2.96) 
Region N N N N N Y 
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,119 7,119 7,119 7,104 7,104 7,104 
R-squared 0.206 0.205 0.205 0.209 0.213 0.215 
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Table C2. Regressions using various measures for religion and trade credit 
 
This table presents results using various measures for religion and accounts payable. The variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. All variables but the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The numbers 
reported in parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-corrected errors clustered by firm and 
year. ***, **, and * indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (two-sided). 
 
 Alternative measures for religion  Alternative measures for Accounts Payables 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AP AP AP  LNAP AP/TL 
       
RELIGION_220KM  0.015**      
 (2.51)      
RELIGION_250KM  0.012**     
  (2.31)     
RELIGION_300KM   0.008**    
   (1.98)    
RELIGION     0.366*** 0.047*** 
     (3.86) (3.02) 
BLOAN -0.020 -0.020 -0.020  -0.044 -0.419*** 
  (-1.16) (-1.16) (-1.16)  (-0.20) (-8.58) 
SGROWTH 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***  0.053*** -0.000 
 (3.95) (3.96) (3.94)  (3.52) (-0.01) 
CASH -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.083***  -1.456*** 0.017 
 (-7.37) (-7.35) (-7.38)  (-7.08) (0.72) 
LISTAGE -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.076** -0.035*** 
 (-0.83) (-0.83) (-0.85)  (-2.38) (-7.19) 
TQ 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***  -0.003 -0.005* 
 (2.83) (2.83) (2.81)  (-0.24) (-1.85) 
INVENTORY 0.025** 0.025** 0.025**  0.523*** -0.017 
 (2.20) (2.20) (2.21)  (3.34) (-0.91) 
SIZE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***  1.073*** -0.008 
 (2.77) (2.76) (2.77)  (40.86) (-1.47) 
ROA -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072***  -0.636*** -0.018 
 (-4.04) (-4.03) (-4.00)  (-2.98) (-0.47) 
TOP1 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.24) (0.26) (0.29)  (0.33) (1.37) 
OUTRAT -0.040* -0.040* -0.040*  -1.079*** -0.045 
 (-1.70) (-1.70) (-1.69)  (-2.90) (-0.82) 
MSDUM 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.057 0.014** 
 (0.73) (0.73) (0.75)  (1.34) (2.34) 
Constant -0.071 -0.070 -0.071  -4.555*** 0.433*** 
 (-1.60) (-1.60) (-1.60)  (-7.84) (3.39) 
Industry Y Y Y  Y Y 
Year Y Y Y  Y Y 
Observations 7,119 7,119 7,119  7,082 7,118 
R-squared 0.205 0.204 0.204   0.668 0.389 
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Table C3. Regressions using alternative measures for religion and trade credit 
This table presents results using alternative measures for religion based on driving distance and driving time. 
The variables are defined in Appendix 1. All variables but the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. The numbers reported in parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-corrected errors 
clustered by firm and year. ***, **, and * indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
(two-sided). 
 Driving Distance  Driving time 
 <=100Km <=200Km <=300Km  <=1.5h <=2h <=3h 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES AP AP AP  AP AP AP 
Religion 0.094*** 0.034*** 0.018**  0.149** 0.149*** 0.047*** 
 (2.96) (2.93) (2.53)  (2.25) (4.00) (2.95) 
BLOAN -0.020 -0.020 -0.020  -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 
  (-1.18) (-1.17) (-1.16)  (-1.17) (-1.25) (-1.18) 
SGROWTH 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***  0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (3.93) (4.02) (3.99)  (3.89) (4.00) (4.01) 
CASH -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.082***  -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.083*** 
 (-7.40) (-7.39) (-7.36)  (-7.25) (-7.33) (-7.33) 
LISTAGE -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.76) (-0.71) (-0.78)  (-0.86) (-0.56) (-0.77) 
TQ 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (2.80) (2.82) (2.82)  (2.78) (2.83) (2.81) 
INVENTORY 0.024** 0.024** 0.025**  0.024** 0.025** 0.025** 
 (2.13) (2.17) (2.18)  (2.15) (2.18) (2.18) 
SIZE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***  0.006*** 0.006** 0.006*** 
 (2.66) (2.67) (2.73)  (2.72) (2.52) (2.67) 
ROA -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.072***  -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.073*** 
 (-4.09) (-4.08) (-4.01)  (-4.06) (-4.21) (-4.08) 
TOP1 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.32) (0.23) (0.26)  (0.38) (0.16) (0.25) 
OUTRAT -0.041* -0.041* -0.039*  -0.041* -0.045* -0.042* 
 (-1.74) (-1.72) (-1.67)  (-1.74) (-1.94) (-1.78) 
MSDUM 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.78) (0.75) (0.78)  (0.75) (0.77) (0.73) 
Constant -0.066 -0.067 -0.070  -0.067 -0.060 -0.066 
 (-1.49) (-1.51) (-1.58)  (-1.53) (-1.35) (-1.49) 
Industry Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Observations 7,119 7,119 7,119  7,119 7,119 7,119 
R-squared 0.206 0.206 0.205  0.204 0.210 0.206 
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Table C4. Religion and trade credit: city-level analysis 
 
This table presents the results of the regression model of the number of religious sites of the city (MRelion) 
and the average trade credits of firms located in the city (MAP). Standard errors are clustered at city level. 
All variables but the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  
  (1) 
VARIABLES MAP 
    
MReligion 0.053*** 
 (3.90) 
Control Y 
Year Y 
Constant 0.034 
 (0.34) 
Observations 1,641 
R-squared 0.118 
 
  
40 
 
Table C5. The impact of different religions and religiosity diversity  
 
This table presents the impact of different religions and religiosity diversity. Panel A results for the effect of 
different religions on accounts payable and Panel B shows the impact of religiosity diversity. In Panel B, we 
define RELIGIONDIV  = 1 − ∑ (𝑅𝑖/𝑅)
2𝑁
𝑖=1  , where N is the number of religions and R is the sum of different 
religions. Ri is the ith religion. Other variables are defined in Appendix 1. All variables but the dummy variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The numbers reported in parentheses are t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity-corrected errors clustered by firm and year. ***, **, and * indicate significant differences at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (two-sided). 
 
Panel C5.1: The impact of accounts payable by religion 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AP AP AP AP 
     
RELIGION_BUDDHISM 0.023**    
 (2.04)    
RELIGION_TAOISM  0.305***   
  (4.58)   
RELIGION_CHRISTIANITY   0.071***  
   (3.05)  
RELIGION_ISLAM    0.009 
    (0.17) 
BLOAN -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.020 
 (-1.16) (-1.27) (-1.16) (-1.14) 
SGROWTH 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (3.91) (3.86) (4.01) (3.78) 
CASH -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.083*** 
 (-7.32) (-7.47) (-7.42) (-7.23) 
LISTAGE -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.93) (-0.75) (-0.69) (-1.12) 
TQ 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (2.83) (2.91) (2.84) (2.76) 
INVENTORY 0.025** 0.024** 0.024** 0.025** 
 (2.22) (2.15) (2.12) (2.25) 
SIZE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (2.80) (2.89) (2.70) (2.86) 
ROA -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.070*** 
 (-4.03) (-4.14) (-4.08) (-3.96) 
TOP1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.27) (0.12) (0.26) (0.39) 
OUTRAT -0.041* -0.043* -0.040* -0.042* 
 (-1.73) (-1.83) (-1.70) (-1.76) 
MSDUM 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.72) (0.50) (0.73) (0.66) 
Constant -0.070 -0.079* -0.069 -0.070 
 (-1.60) (-1.78) (-1.56) (-1.61) 
Industry Y Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,119 7,119 7,119 7,119 
R-squared 0.204 0.211 0.207 0.202 
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Panel C5.2: The impact of accounts payable by religiosity diversity 
 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Diversity 
among 
 all religions 
Diversity 
between 
Eastern and 
Western 
religions 
Diversity  
between 
Eastern 
religions 
(Buddhism and 
Taoism) 
Diversity 
between 
Western 
religions 
(Christianity 
and Islam) 
Diversity 
between Islam 
and other 
religions 
       
RELIGIONDIV 0.031*** 0.029** 0.034*** -0.003 -0.005 
 (2.87) (2.41) (3.49) (-0.31) (-0.42) 
BLOAN -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 
 (-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.19) (-1.14) (-1.13) 
GROWTH 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (3.84) (3.87) (3.66) (3.77) (3.76) 
CASH -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.082*** 
 (-7.29) (-7.22) (-7.26) (-7.23) (-7.20) 
LISTAGE -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.84) (-0.87) (-1.15) (-1.15) (-1.15) 
TQ 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (2.72) (2.76) (2.67) (2.78) (2.78) 
INVENTORY 0.024** 0.024** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 
 (2.12) (2.12) (2.21) (2.24) (2.25) 
SIZE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (2.89) (2.89) (3.00) (2.87) (2.88) 
ROA -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.068*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (-4.01) (-4.01) (-3.88) (-4.00) (-3.98) 
TOP1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.39) (0.35) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) 
OUTRAT -0.041* -0.041* -0.042* -0.042* -0.043* 
 (-1.74) (-1.74) (-1.74) (-1.76) (-1.79) 
MSDUM 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.57) (0.63) (0.51) (0.65) (0.64) 
Constant -0.089** -0.082* -0.084* -0.070 -0.070 
 (-2.00) (-1.87) (-1.94) (-1.60) (-1.61) 
      
Observations 7,119 7,119 7,119 7,119 7,119 
R-squared 0.206 0.204 0.207 0.202 0.202 
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Table C6. Formal institution and the relations between religion and trade credit 
 
This table presents results for the effect of law on the relation of religion and accounts payable. The variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. All variables but the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The 
numbers reported in parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-corrected errors clustered by firm 
and year. ***, **, and * indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (two-sided). 
 
 
Property right 
protection 
lawyer/total 
population 
preferential 
policy 
treaty 
port 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AP AP AP AP 
     
RELIGION 0.048*** 0.040*** 0.055** 0.066** 
 (2.91) (2.83) (2.44) (2.54) 
RELIGION*FINSTIT
U -0.043** -0.034* -0.027* -0.054** 
 (-2.23) (-1.75) (-1.68) (-2.00) 
FINSTITU 0.014** 0.011 0.008 0.017** 
 (1.97) (1.39) (1.63) (2.57) 
BLOAN -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 
 (-1.18) (-1.20) (-1.18) (-1.17) 
SGROWTH 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (3.88) (3.92) (3.91) (3.93) 
CASH -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.084*** 
 (-7.76) (-7.70) (-7.46) (-7.73) 
LISTAGE -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.79) (-0.71) (-0.64) (-0.56) 
TQ 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (2.82) (2.82) (2.86) (2.83) 
INVENTORY 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.024** 
 (2.21) (2.20) (2.22) (2.11) 
SIZE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (2.76) (2.74) (2.75) (2.74) 
ROA -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.072*** 
 (-4.13) (-4.07) (-4.07) (-4.10) 
TOP1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.27) (0.24) (0.28) (0.29) 
OUTRAT -0.038* -0.040* -0.039* -0.040* 
 (-1.65) (-1.74) (-1.67) (-1.73) 
MSDUM 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.69) (0.70) (0.61) (0.58) 
Constant -0.077* -0.074* -0.081* -0.083* 
 (-1.76) (-1.71) (-1.79) (-1.87) 
Industry Y Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,119 7,119 7,119 7,119 
R-squared 0.208 0.207 0.206 0.208 
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Table C7. Bank financing and the relations between religion and trade credit 
 
This table presents results for the effects of bank financing on the relation of religion and accounts payable. 
The variables are defined in Appendix 1. All variables but the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. In Column (1), when we use bank loan as the dependent variable, it is not an explanatory variable. 
The numbers reported in parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-corrected errors clustered 
by firm and year. ***, **, and * indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (two-
sided). 
 
 Bank loan 
Financial 
development 
Financial  
competition Monetary policy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AP AP AP AP 
RELIGION 0.036*** 0.076** 0.074*** 0.019*** 
 (3.10) (2.40) (2.88) (2.73) 
RELIGION*BFINANCING -0.100** -0.006** -0.006** -0.029*** 
 (-2.14) (-2.18) (-2.35) (-3.65) 
BFINANCING 0.008 0.003*** 0.002* -0.008 
 (0.31) (2.60) (1.87) (-1.34) 
BLOAN omitted -0.021 -0.021 -0.019 
 － (-1.20) (-1.21) (-1.11) 
SGROWTH 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (4.02) (4.06) (4.00) (3.44) 
CASH -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.081*** 
 (-7.42) (-7.75) (-7.71) (-7.70) 
LISTAGE -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.74) (-0.60) (-0.59) (-0.57) 
TQ 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003** 
 (2.86) (2.82) (2.87) (2.44) 
INVENTORY 0.026** 0.024** 0.024** 0.025** 
 (2.31) (2.12) (2.15) (2.24) 
SIZE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006** 
 (2.76) (2.62) (2.64) (2.53) 
ROA -0.072*** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.003 
 (-4.14) (-4.18) (-4.10) (-0.13) 
TOP1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.21) (0.24) (0.17) (0.20) 
OUTRAT -0.042* -0.043* -0.040* -0.040* 
 (-1.79) (-1.82) (-1.69) (-1.72) 
MSDUM 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.63) (0.72) (0.73) (0.66) 
Constant -0.076* -0.090** -0.080* -0.063 
 (-1.74) (-2.03) (-1.82) (-1.43) 
Industry Y Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,119 7,119 7,119 7,115 
R-squared 0.208 0.209 0.208 0.211 
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Table C8. Religion and trade credit overdue 
 
This table presents results for the effect of religion on trade credit overdue. The variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. All variables but the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES AP(≤1 year) AP(>1 year) AP_DUE 
    
RELIGION 0.022*** -0.005*** -0.091*** 
 (3.49) (-4.40) (-6.83) 
BLOAN -0.021 -0.002 -0.053 
 (-1.38) (-0.76) (-1.60) 
SGROWTH 0.004*** 0.001 0.005 
 (2.75) (1.42) (0.70) 
CASH -0.073*** -0.007*** -0.048* 
 (-5.84) (-3.35) (-1.78) 
LISTAGE -0.002 0.001* 0.024*** 
 (-0.93) (1.71) (4.35) 
TQ 0.002* 0.001*** 0.009*** 
 (1.66) (3.43) (3.42) 
INVENTORY 0.012 0.010*** 0.035 
 (1.12) (3.00) (1.10) 
SIZE 0.007*** -0.001 -0.017*** 
 (3.44) (-1.30) (-4.29) 
ROA -0.036** -0.026*** -0.237*** 
 (-2.31) (-6.24) (-4.08) 
TOP1 0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.92) (-1.75) (-1.28) 
OUTRAT -0.034 -0.005 0.087 
 (-1.54) (-0.86) (1.00) 
MSDUM 0.004 -0.001 -0.013** 
 (1.41) (-1.59) (-1.97) 
Constant -0.092** 0.018 0.383*** 
 (-2.26) (1.57) (4.24) 
Industry Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y 
Observations 7,080 7,080 7,064 
R-squared 0.182 0.087 0.090 
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Table C9. The number of registered religious groups and trade credit 
 
This table presents results for the effect of the number of registered religious groups (GroupNum) in the 
firm’s headquartered county on trade credit. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. All variables but the 
dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  
 
 POLS FE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
      
GroupNum 0.158* 0.144** 
 (1.90) (1.99) 
Bloan -0.023 -0.023 
 (-1.18) (-1.48) 
Sgrowth 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (2.68) (3.15) 
Cash -0.088*** -0.088*** 
 (-7.76) (-9.82) 
Age -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.83) (-0.53) 
Tq 0.003** 0.003*** 
 (2.33) (2.58) 
Inventory 0.020* 0.013 
 (1.79) (0.85) 
Size 0.006** 0.003 
 (2.53) (1.25) 
Roa -0.068*** -0.062*** 
 (-2.84) (-3.64) 
Top1 -0.000 -0.000* 
 (-0.15) (-1.80) 
Outrat -0.040* -0.017 
 (-1.73) (-0.99) 
MSdum 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.66) (-1.43) 
Year Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect No Yes 
Constant -0.046 0.023 
 (-1.04) (0.48) 
Observations 5,772 5,772 
R-squared 0.212 0.201 
 
 
46 
 
Table C10. Results based on a sub-sample of firms that experience relocation 
 
This table presents results for the effect of religion on trade credit based on sub-sample of firms that experience 
relocation. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. All variables but the dummy variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 100km 150km 200km 250km 
     
Religion 0.105** 0.044* 0.042** 0.038** 
 (2.31) (1.81) (2.27) (2.48) 
Bloan -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.018 
 (-1.53) (-1.54) (-1.44) (-1.39) 
Sgrowth 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (3.59) (3.52) (3.56) (3.56) 
Cash -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.081*** 
 (-4.88) (-4.85) (-4.88) (-4.86) 
Age 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.55) (0.52) (0.56) (0.62) 
Tq 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.38) (3.38) (3.32) (3.32) 
Inventory 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 (0.40) (0.53) (0.51) (0.55) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.35) (-0.31) (-0.37) (-0.38) 
Roa -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
 (-3.67) (-3.68) (-3.65) (-3.63) 
Top1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.65) (-0.65) (-0.64) (-0.67) 
Outrat -0.145*** -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.147*** 
 (-3.33) (-3.33) (-3.34) (-3.36) 
MSdum -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-1.24) (-1.34) (-1.37) (-1.38) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.114* 0.115* 0.116* 0.113* 
 (1.67) (1.68) (1.69) (1.66) 
Observations 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 
Number of Firms 176 176 176 176 
R-squared 0.099 0.097 0.099 0.100 
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Appendix D. Background of the localization of trading partners in China 
The culture differences, market segmentation and natural barriers across provinces leader to the 
localization of trading partners in China. We analyze the information on the top 5 suppliers of Chinese listed 
firms from annual reports and find that suppliers from the same province account for around 40% of supply, 
and the suppliers from the same province or neighboring provinces account for 55%. The localization of 
small supplier is likely to be higher given the principle of cost-benefit and economies of scale. These figures 
further highlight the important role of regional religiosity.  
China is a county with 9.60 million square kilometers of land, which is divided into 34 provinces (Tian 
et al., 2017). There are huge differences in customs, culture, language and philosophy across these 
provinces, due to the development history of the provinces (Wu et al., 2014). These differences bring about 
obstacles to sociocultural integration, particularly to the perceptual and cognitive factors (Stahl and Voigt, 
2008). In addition, China's administrative divisions tend to be bounded by natural barriers such as the great 
mountain or river. For example, Shanxi and Shaanxi are bounded by Yellow River; Henan and Anhui are 
bounded by Dabie Mountain; Xinjiang and Xizang are bounded by Kunlun Mountains; Shanxi and Hebei 
is bounded by Tai-hang Mountains. These natural barriers increase the cost to the economic exchanges 
between each other. Finally, there is evident market segmentation among provinces in China (Kumar, 1994; 
Young, 2000), which makes it costly for the flow of products and capital across provinces. These arguments 
in the literature suggest possible reasons for the localization of trading partners.  
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